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Abstract 
 This paper compares the dividend policy of owner-controlled firms with that of firms 
where the owners are a minority relative to non-owner employees, customers, and community 
citizens. We find that regardless of whether owners or non-owners control the firm, the strong 
stakeholder uses the dividend payout decision to mitigate rather than to intensify the conflict of 
interest with the weak stakeholder. Hence, the higher the potential agency cost as reflected in 
the firm’s stakeholder structure, the more the actual agency cost is reduced by the strong 
stakeholder’s dividend payout decision. These findings are consistent with a dividend policy in 
which opportunistic power abuse in stakeholder conflicts is discouraged by costly 
consequences for the abuser at a later stage. Indirect evidence supports this interpretation. 
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1. Introduction 
Stockholders invest in firms to obtain returns on their money. Conflicts of interest 
between the stakeholders might reduce these returns. For instance, the stockholders might 
worry that the employees use the firm’s resources to produce private benefits at the 
stockholders’ expense. If this agency problem appears threatening to the stockholders, they 
might hesitate to put more money at the firm’s disposal. This reluctance to finance the firm 
might adversely affect the real economy by increasing the firm’s cost of capital and decreasing 
its investment in labor and productive assets (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 Our paper analyzes empirically how dividend policy influences the seriousness of this 
conflict of interest, focusing on the relationship between the firm’s owners (the stockholders) 
and its non-owners (the employees, customers, and community citizens). In particular, we 
study whether the dividend payout decision is used to mitigate or to intensify the agency 
problem inherent in the firm’s stakeholder structure. We find that firms controlled by the non-
owner stakeholders pay out significantly more of their earnings than firms controlled by the 
owners do. This result supports the notion that reducing agency costs through lowering free 
cash flow is an important concern when non-owner stakeholders have the power to determine 
the firm’s dividend policy. 
 Conflicts of interest in a firm might be framed as tensions between insiders and 
outsiders. The firm’s resources are controlled by the insiders, who might lack the incentives to 
abstain from making self-serving decisions at the outsiders’ expense (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; La Porta et al., 1997). We study an unusual combination of insiders and outsiders. The 
insiders in one of the two firm types we analyze are neither the owners, the majority owners, 
nor the CEO, who have received almost all the attention in existing research (Becht et al., 
2003). Rather, the majority control rights are held by the employees, customers, and 
community citizens. In contrast, the second firm type in our sample represents a classic 
situation where the insiders are owners. Finally, and importantly, regulation ensures that there 
is no insider-outsider issue between majority and minority owners in either firm type. 
 This setting allows us to study a clean and unexplored setting where dividend policy 
can be used to influence only one particular insider-outsider conflict, and one that is not classic 
in nature. There is no majority-minority issue among the owners, the owners might be both 
insiders and outsiders, and the non-owner stakeholders constitute a heterogeneous set whose 
preferences might deviate strongly from those of the stockholders. The key question is how the 
insiders in these firms use dividend policy to handle the potential conflict of interest with the 
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outsiders. We address this question by testing the two existing theories of how dividends 
interact with stakeholder conflicts. These theories are the outcome model and the substitute 
model (La Porta et al., 2000; Cheffins, 2006; Ostergaard and Smith, 2011). 
 The outcome model predicts that when given the chance, non-owner stakeholders will 
opportunistically use the dividend policy to capture private benefits. Therefore, firms 
controlled by non-owner insiders will pay lower dividends per unit of earnings and allocate 
correspondingly more to private benefits for the non-owners than firms controlled by owners 
will. In contrast, the substitute model argues that non-owners will benefit later if they choose a 
dividend policy now that reduces potential conflicts with the owners. Our finding that dividend 
payout increases with decreasing owner control supports the substitute model, which posits that 
owner control and dividend payout are alternative ways of disciplining the firm’s non-owners. 
That is, close monitoring and low free cash flow are substitutes. 
 Existing studies of agency problems and dividend policy do not directly test the 
predictions of the two competing dividend theories. Moreover, they tend to capture a wide 
variety of insider-outsider conflicts, regressing the firm’s dividend payout on its ownership 
concentration in samples where ownership concentration varies widely in the cross section 
(Rozeff, 1982; Moh’d et al., 1995; Khan, 2006; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2006; Renneboog 
and Trojanowski, 2007).1 We test the two dividend theories directly, and we study an 
environment where potential conflicts between large and small owners are negligible because a 
binding legal constraint makes ownership concentration low in every firm. In contrast, the 
potential seriousness of the conflict between owners and non-owners varies more than usual. 
This variation is not driven by cross-sectional differences in ownership concentration, 
however, but rather by differences in organizational form, which allocate majority control to 
the owners in one firm type and to non-owners in the other. Thus, ownership concentration is 
low in every sample firm, and the owners are strong relative to the non-owners in one firm type 
and weak in the other. 
 Our sample is the population of listed Norwegian commercial banks and savings banks. 
Commercial banks are regular stock companies that are controlled by their stockholders. In 
                                                 
1 Higher ownership concentration reduces the potential conflict between owners and non-owners, while increasing 
the conflict between large and small owners. The former agency problem is considered the more serious in 
common law countries, whereas the latter is thought to dominate under civil law, where ownership concentration 
tends to be higher (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The relationship between owners and non-owners has traditionally 
been analyzed as conflicts of interest between owners and the CEO or between owners and creditors (Becht et al., 
2003). There is hardly any study on conflicts between owners and stakeholders such as employees (Fauver and 
Fuerst (2006) is a rare exception), customers, and society at large. The empirical literature on the conflict between 
large and small owners has focused on the majority stockholder’s expropriation of the minority (Faccio et al., 
2001). 
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contrast, the stockholders of a savings bank hold only one fourth of the control rights. The 
remaining three quarters of the control rights are split equally between the employees, the 
depositors, and community citizens. The residual cash-flow rights are held by the stockholders 
in both bank types.  
 Since non-owners are the insiders in the savings bank, they determine its dividend 
policy. When making this decision, they know that their interests might be in conflict with 
those of the owners (the outsiders). For instance, the employees on the board might want less 
monitoring of their effort and more moderate restructuring than the owners might want. 
Depositors might vote for higher interest rates and lower risk on their savings than the owners 
might vote for. The community representatives might be more negative to reduced employment 
and more positive to cheap lending to local businesses than the owners might be.  
 Given this lack of interest alignment between owners and non-owners, the governance 
structure might also make it particularly easy for the CEOs of savings banks to make decisions 
that are better aligned with their interests than with those of the owners. For instance, the CEO 
might be less aggressive than owners might in wage negotiations with employees, more lenient 
than owners might when downsizing operations, and more interested than owners might in 
financing growth with retained earnings rather than with new debt. Such a tendency to pursue a 
so-called quiet life has been documented as a CEO response to reduced owner pressure in US 
firms (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). 
 Hence, non-owner stakeholders can only informally influence the decisions of the 
owner-controlled commercial banks. In contrast, they have formal control in the savings banks, 
where the owners constitute a minority. The potential agency cost in the savings banks is due 
to conflicts of interest between the owners as outsiders and the non-owner stakeholders 
(including management) as insiders. In either organizational form, no single owner or alliance 
of owners can own or vote for more than one tenth of the equity. Both organizational forms 
face the same product market opportunities and the same regulatory constraints. 
 We test the predictions of the two competing dividend models for how the potential 
insider-outsider conflict interacts with the bank’s dividend policy. The outcome model predicts 
that commercial banks will pay higher dividends per unit of earnings than savings banks will. 
This happens because the owners of commercial banks will use their control to reduce the 
retained earnings and hence the free cash flow that is under the non-owner stakeholders’ 
discretion. Such a dividend policy will offer fewer opportunities for non-owners to finance 
perks for managers, to overprotect employees, to underprice output to customers, or to sponsor 
community projects. Correspondingly, the outcome model predicts that the non-owner 
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stakeholders in savings banks will myopically use their control to ensure financing of their 
private benefits by paying out low dividends to the owners.  
The substitute model assumes more sophisticated stakeholders and makes a prediction 
opposite to that made by the outcome model: Commercial banks will pay lower dividends than 
savings banks will. This happens because the owners of commercial banks will use their 
control rights to influence the firm as directors in the boardroom and as discussion partners 
with management rather than by bluntly blocking management’s access to a high free cash 
flow. Similarly, the substitute model posits that the non-owners who control the savings banks 
will benefit later by using their power to pay high dividends now. This happens because a high 
dividend reduces the owners’ fear of subsequent expropriation. Thus, the dividend payout 
decision is disciplined by potentially adverse effects for the insider at a later stage. For 
instance, paying out high dividends might be a way for growing firms to build reputation for 
subsequent equity issues (La Porta et al., 2000; Cheffins, 2006). Paying out high dividends 
might also reduce information asymmetry costs for small firms in particular by forcing them 
more often to the issue market (Easterbrook, 1984). Moreover, management’s compensation in 
savings banks might fall and their career opportunities might deteriorate if the stock price 
drops after a shift towards retaining a higher percentage of earnings. This all suggests that the 
non-owner-controlled savings bank with high growth and small size will pay particularly high 
dividends.  
 Our major finding is that savings banks pay significantly higher dividends than 
commercial banks do. Also, more is paid out when the bank is small and grows fast. These 
results survive when we control for dividend persistence, financial leverage, stock liquidity, 
and for unobservable firm and industry effects. The findings are also robust to using alternative 
data sets and econometric techniques, to peculiarities of the ownership structure, and to 
alternative dividend payout measures.  
 This evidence is consistent with the substitute model of how dividend payments and 
stakeholder conflicts interact. It is inconsistent with the outcome model. The findings support 
the notion that the strong stakeholder (the insider) uses the dividend policy to reduce the 
agency conflict with the weak stakeholder (the outsider), as such behavior serves the best 
interest of the strong stakeholder in the long run. This interpretation holds regardless of 
whether the strong stakeholder is the owners or the non-owners. 
Our findings are in line with those of Faccio et al. (2001) and John and Knyazeva 
(2006). Using samples that are limited to regular stock companies where the voting rights are 
held exclusively by the owners, both report evidence that we interpret to be in favor of the 
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substitute model. In particular, Faccio et al. (2001) find that dividends in corporate pyramids 
are higher the stronger the control chain through the pyramid, and the larger the difference 
between the controlling blockholder’s voting rights and cash-flow rights in firms with strong 
control chains. Since conflict between majority and minority owners is the dominant agency 
problem in such firms, their findings support the substitute hypothesis. John and Knyazeva 
(2006) relate dividends to an index of overall governance quality rather than to just one of its 
components, such as ownership structure. They find support for the substitute model, because 
dividends increase with decreasing governance quality. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 makes the basic prediction and 
presents the institutional setting of our sample firms. Descriptive statistics follow in section 3, 
and section 4 reports the statistical tests. We summarize and conclude in section 5. 
 
2. Basic hypothesis and institutional setting 
Studying how the aggregate dividend payout in a country relates to its legal regime, La 
Porta et al. (2000) introduce the outcome model and the substitute model as two alternative 
perspectives on how stakeholder conflicts and dividends interact. The authors do not develop 
the two models formally, but regard them as tools for intuitively understanding the relationship 
between dividends and stockholder protection across different legal regimes (La Porta et al., 
2000, p. 5). Formal models that reflect different components of the La Porta et al. logic have 
been developed by Rozeff (1982), Fluck (1999), and Gomes (2000).  
 We apply the La Porta et al. framework within a given legal regime rather than across 
different regimes. Unlike Kahn (2006), Renneboog and Szilagyi (2006), and Renneboog and 
Trojanowski (2007), we test the two dividend theories directly. Another difference is that we 
do not vary relative stakeholder power by varying ownership concentration, but rather by 
varying the organizational form across firms that all have low ownership concentration. 
Finally, one of our two firm types has non-owner stakeholders as the legal insiders, whereas 
the owners are the outsiders. Specifically, the stockholders have the majority in commercial 
banks (forretningsbank). In savings banks (grunnfondsbank), however, stockholders hold only 
a minority stake, because the firm is controlled by its employees, customers, and the 
community citizens (i.e., non-owner stakeholders). Hence, ownership concentration is low and 
homogeneous in both organizational forms by an exogenous constraint, there is large 
heterogeneity in stakeholder control rights, and this heterogeneity is unrelated to ownership 
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concentration. The other dividend determinants are quite homogeneous across the sample, 
because both firm types are listed, face the same market opportunities, and are subject to the 
same regulation. 
Given the two dividend theories and our empirical setting, the basic hypothesis is 
straightforward: The outcome model predicts that commercial banks will pay higher dividends 
than savings banks will. Under the substitute model, commercial banks will pay lower 
dividends than savings banks will.  
Table 1 shows how control rights and stockholders’ residual cash-flow rights are 
distributed in the two organizational forms. We measure control rights as the fraction of the 
board seats voted for by the stakeholder group in question. Cash-flow rights are the fraction of 
earnings and equity the stockholder can claim. The commercial bank is controlled and owned 
by its stockholders, as they hold 73% of the votes and all the residual cash-flow rights. 
Employees hold the remaining control rights and no cash-flow rights. Thus, commercial banks 
are like other firms regarding stockholders’ ownership rights.2 
Insert table 1 here 
 The stockholders of a savings bank have only 25% of its voting rights. The remaining 
75% is split equally between employees, depositors, and the community citizens. Similarly, 
stockholders cannot claim the full residual cash flow, but rather can claim only a fraction that 
varies between 5% and 74% across the sample. This fraction equals the stockholders’ share of 
the firm’s equity. The remaining cash-flow rights are ownerless in the sense that no stakeholder 
can claim any part of them. Thus, the earnings and the capital that do not belong to the 
stockholders cannot be distributed to any stakeholder. 
 This organizational form for savings banks was created in Norway in 1985 by a law 
that allows for the issue of equity securities by banks that used to be nonprofit. A nonprofit is 
an entirely ownerless company, since no stakeholder has a right to its residual cash flow 
(Hansmann, 1996). Thus, a savings bank is a hybrid between an ownerless company and a 
regular stock company. Except for the restricted voting rights (25% for stockholders as a 
group) as described in table 1, the equity securities issued by a savings bank carry the same 
ownership rights as the equity securities in a commercial bank do.3  
                                                 
2 Limited liability firms in Norway with more than 200 employees are required by constitutional law to have one 
third of their directors elected by and among the employees. Industry-specific regulation reduces this fraction to 
27% for commercial banks. All commercial banks in our sample have more than 200 employees. 
3 Stockholder-owned equity is senior to ownerless equity by construction. Hence, the stockholders’ equity claim is 
less risky in a savings bank than in a commercial bank. 
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Like all Norwegian firms above a certain size, banks have a two-tiered board structure. 
Except for charter amendments, which require a two-thirds supermajority, all decisions in both 
tiers are made by simple majority. The supervisory board writes the corporate charter, hires 
and fires the CEO, sets the CEO’s salary, and appoints the executive board. 4 The CEO has a 
vote on the executive board, but cannot be its chairperson.5  
 The dividend is proposed by the executive board in both bank types. The final dividend 
decision in commercial banks is made by majority vote in the stockholder meeting. In savings 
banks, the supervisory board makes the decision by majority vote among the four stakeholder 
groups. The dividend proposed by the executive board can be reduced by these two bodies, but 
cannot be increased.6 Dividends are paid once a year. No regulation mandates a minimum 
payout, and the tax system is neutral regarding dividends and capital gains, at both the firm 
level and the investor level. 
  The earnings of a savings bank are generated by both the owned and the ownerless 
equity. Hence, the earnings that belong to the stockholders are the total earnings multiplied by 
the stockholders’ share of the total equity (i.e., their fractional cash-flow rights). To illustrate, 
suppose total earnings are 300 units, that stockholders own 40% of the firm’s equity, and that 
dividends are 100 units. This example implies that stockholders own 120 units of the earnings, 
and that 100 units of this claim are paid out to them. Thus, the payout ratio is 83%. The 
remaining 20 units of stockholders’ earnings are retained, along with the 180 units (300 - 120) 
that are ownerless. This latter amount can never be paid out, as regulation prevents the 
stockholders from expropriating the ownerless equity. Thus, stockholders can be paid all the 
earnings they own, but not more (120 units plus any retained stockholder earnings from earlier 
years in the example). The remainder must be retained, since nobody can claim it (180 units 
plus the ownerless earnings from earlier years). Hence, the non-owner stakeholders who 
control a savings bank can use dividend policy to reduce the potential agency conflict with the 
bank’s owners. The larger the fraction of stockholders’ earnings they pay out, the less room 
there is for agency costs. Conversely, the non-owners might intensify the potential conflict by 
paying low dividends. Observing the former dividend policy (high payout in savings banks) 
                                                 
4 The supervisory board of commercial banks must have either 15, 30, or 45 members. There is no such rule for 
savings banks. The executive board of commercial banks must have between 5 and 9 members. The minimum in 
savings banks is 4 members, but there is no maximum. 
5 The stockholder meeting of commercial banks elects 73% of the supervisory board members, while the 
remaining 23% is elected by the employees. The supervisory board of savings banks is elected by the employees, 
stockholders, customers, and local politicians, who each choose 25% of the members. See table 1. 
6 The supervisory board in either bank type normally states its dividend policy rather vaguely in the annual report, 
a common term being “competitive dividend payout.” Nevertheless, some banks are quite specific, making 
statements like “we generally pay the earnings out as dividends rather than retain them.” 
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would support the substitute model, whereas observing the latter (low payout) would support 
the outcome model. 
 Overall, this institutional environment implies that the controlling stakeholder group in 
either organizational form has wide discretion in dividend policy. In particular, any firm can 
choose to pay no dividend whatsoever. The maximum ratio of dividends to stockholders’ 
earnings is 100% if the dividend is paid only out of earnings for that year. The ratio is negative 
if current earnings are negative and the dividend is funded by retained past earnings. Finally, 
the payout ratio exceeds 100% if the stakeholders in control choose to pay out to stockholders 
all stockholders’ earnings for the year plus part of their retained past earnings. 
 
3. Descriptive statistics 
According to table 2, roughly 40% of the 287 firm years in the sample come from 
commercial banks, which are more numerous than savings banks in the first half of the period 
and less numerous in the second. The commercial bank sector is in the aggregate about twice 
as large as the savings bank sector. The average commercial bank is four times the size of the 
average savings bank.  
Insert table 2 here 
 Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for risk, return, stock liquidity, and growth. Savings 
banks are less risky than are commercial banks according to balance sheet proxies for total 
risk, but the difference as measured by the systematic risk of the stock return is not statistically 
different from zero.7 The two bank types have similar book return on assets and market return 
on equity. This similarity in risk and return might suggest that the two organizational forms 
have comparable economic efficiency. Savings banks have higher dividend yield, lower stock 
liquidity, and higher growth. The higher dividend yield in savings banks is a first sign of 
support for the substitute model. It reflects that although the stock return of the two firm types 
does not differ, the dividend component of the stock return is higher in the firm type with the 
weakest owner control and the highest growth. 
Insert table 3 here 
 Ownership characteristics are reported in table 4. The median equity holding of the 
largest owner is 10% in commercial banks and 6% in savings banks. This concentration, which 
is one-third the typical level for firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, reflects a binding 
                                                 
7 This pattern of risk based on the balance sheet is consistent with findings from the United States that a bank’s 
total risk increases when stockholders have greater control rights than depositors do (Esty, 1997a, 1997b). 
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regulatory constraint.8 Aggregate personal (i.e., direct) ownership is typically 20% in 
commercial banks and 52% in savings bank. The latter figure is about three times higher than 
for other listed firms on the Oslo Stock Exchange as a whole (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2006). 
Insert table 4 here 
 The two organizational forms we described in table 1 reflect that the division of power 
between owners and non-owners is driven by bank type: Owners control the commercial bank, 
while non-owners control the savings bank. For given organizational form, however, there is 
also a second determinant of power sharing which stems from the difference between 
stockholders’ cash-flow rights and control rights. We measure this wedge by the separation 
ratio, which we define as sep ≡ (c - v) / c. Here, c is the owners’ fraction of cash-flow rights in 
the firm and v is their fraction of voting rights.9 A sep of 0 means there is no separation, a 
positive sep means stockholders have fewer voting rights than cash-flow rights, and a negative 
sep reflects the opposite. The separation ratio is 0.27 in all commercial banks, because 
stockholders as a group always control 73% of the votes for directors (v = 0.73) and hold all 
the cash-flow rights (c = 1). In contrast, sep varies considerably across savings banks. 
Although their stockholders always hold 25% of the voting rights, table 1 showed that their 
fraction of cash-flow rights varies between 5% and 74% in the cross section. This 
heterogeneity produces a mean sep for savings banks of 0.18, varying between -0.15 and 
+0.49.  
 Table 5 describes dividend policy by the payout propensity in panel A, by the payout 
ratio in panel B, and by the retention ratio in panel C. Panel A shows that most banks pay 
dividends, and that savings banks do so more often than commercial banks do (89% vs. 68% of 
the time, respectively). Unlike commercial banks, most savings banks also paid dividends 
during the banking crisis in 1988–1992, when all banks experienced a series of negative 
earnings shocks.10  
Insert table 5 here 
                                                 
8 The typical ownership concentration is 30% in Norway (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2006) and 40% in Continental 
Europe (Barca and Becht, 2001). The mean exceeds the median for commercial banks in table 4 because the state 
held very large stakes in a few banks around the banking crisis in 1988–1992. 
9 No bank in the sample has dual-class shares. Since no stockholder can own more than 10% of the equity, we 
disregard ownership through pyramids when constructing the ownership structure characteristics. 
10 Thirteen small and medium sized banks failed in 1988–1990, and large commercial banks started failing 
towards the end of 1990. As government support of distressed banks sometimes required the write-off of existing 
equity, the three largest commercial banks came under full state ownership in 1992. The industry regained 
profitability in 1993, and the state holdings were gradually reduced (Moe et al., 2004). By the end of our sample 
period, the state held a 48% minority stake in the largest commercial bank and had sold their shares in the two 
others. 
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The payout ratio in panel B is measured as cash dividends divided by stockholders’ 
earnings. The earnings component (i.e., the denominator) of the payout ratio in commercial 
banks is total earnings, since all the earnings belong to the stockholders. In savings banks, 
however, the denominator of the payout ratio is only the part of earnings that is owned by the 
stockholders. This amount, which is the part of total earnings that the non-owners can 
potentially expropriate from the owners, is always less than total earnings. The maximum ratio 
of stockholders’ earnings to total earnings is 74% according to table 1.  
Panel B includes only the subsample of dividend payers from panel A. It shows that 
banks in general distribute a high portion of earnings to their stockholders. In fact, both the 
payout propensity and the payout ratio are unusually large by national standards.11 Although 
there is considerable variation from bank to bank, and particularly among the savings banks, 
the average payout ratio is significantly higher in savings banks than in commercial banks. 
This is true for the period as a whole, during the earnings shocks of the banking crisis, and in 
eight of the fourteen sample years. In fact, most savings banks pay out all the stockholders’ 
earnings as dividends. This means that practically the only stockholder asset withheld by 
savings banks is the cash that stockholders paid in at the equity offering. In contrast, a typical 
commercial bank withholds these proceeds plus roughly 55% of the earnings.12 
 This aggregate dividend pattern supports the substitute model: The non-owner-
controlled savings banks pay out more of stockholders’ earnings than the owner-controlled 
commercial banks do. Notice, however, that because savings banks are also financed by 
ownerless equity, to which no dividend can be paid, the high payout does not imply that only a 
small part of a savings bank’s total earnings is retained. Panel C documents that the average 
fraction of total earnings retained is 59% in savings banks, which is not statistically different 
from the 52% in commercial banks. According to the medians, the savings banks retain 
significantly more. Thus, the differential payout policy in the two organizational forms is not 
necessarily crucial for how retained equity can finance regulatory capital requirements and 
future growth. However, the difference does reflect how dividends might be used to influence 
the seriousness of the conflict between owners and non-owners. This conflict is independent of 
the ownerless equity. 
                                                 
11 The median payout propensity at the Oslo Stock Exchange is 47% in the sample period, and the median payout 
ratio is 38% for firms that pay dividends (Source: Oslo Stock Exchange). 
12 The mean and median payout ratios in savings banks sometimes exceed 100%. This happens because dividends 
in year t can be paid both from year t earnings and from undistributed earnings generated before t. Since earnings 
vary over time, a policy of stable, high dividends per share might easily produce a payout ratio above 100% in a 
given year. This is more likely to happen in years when earnings are unusually low.  
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 We argued in section 1 that the dividend policy of firms controlled by non-owners 
might be disciplined by several mechanisms, such as the need to raise new equity in the future. 
Moreover, table 3 showed that the growth rate is higher in savings banks than in commercial 
banks, which does suggest a higher financing need in savings banks. Evidence based on the 
firms’ equity issues is provided in table 6. The table shows that although commercial banks go 
more often to the issue market than savings banks do, both bank types expand their share 
capital by roughly the same proportion when issues are made. A typical savings bank sells new 
equity about every six years and increases its share capital (owned plus ownerless) by about 
15% on these occasions. 
Insert table 6 here 
 Summarizing, the descriptive statistics have shown that the savings banks in our 
sample, which are controlled by non-owner stakeholders, have similar asset returns, stock 
returns, and systematic risk as do commercial banks, which are owned and controlled by their 
stockholders. Savings banks are smaller, have higher growth, more of their equity is held by 
personal owners, and are as dependent on the equity issue market as commercial banks are. 
Savings banks pay dividends more often and distribute more of stockholders’ earnings when 
they pay. 
    
4. Statistical tests 
We report the estimates of the base-case model in section 4.1., followed by a series of 
robustness tests in section 4.2. 
 
4.1. The base-case model 
We specify the base-case relationship between dividends and its potential determinants 
for firm i at time t as follows: 
 
1 2 1 3 4 5 6
(1)    Dividend Savings Dividend Leverage Liquidity Growth Sizeit i it it it it it itα β β β β β β= + + + + + + +− ε
                                                
 
Dividend is cash dividends divided by stockholders’ earnings. Savings is a dummy variable, 
which is 1 for a savings bank and 0 for a commercial bank, and Leverage is the book value of 
debt divided by the book value of assets.13 Liquidity is the value of traded equity divided by its 
 
13 We measure debt as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity. Equity in commercial banks is 
measured as paid-in equity (face value and excess of paid-in over face value) plus retained earnings. Equity in 
savings banks is ownerless equity (face value and retained earnings for the ownerless capital) plus owned equity 
(paid-in and retained equity for the stockholders). A savings bank in our sample is fundamentally different from 
an S&L, which is mutually owned by its depositors. Therefore, we do not distinguish between deposits and other 
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market value. Growth is the relative increase in the book value of assets during the year, and 
Size is the log of the book value of assets. Flow variables are measured over the full year, while 
the other variables are measured at year end. 
 The key determinant in (1) is the savings bank dummy, and its coefficient β1 is 
predicted to be negative in the outcome model (savings banks pay lower dividends) and 
positive in the substitute model (savings banks pay higher dividends). The remaining 
determinants, which are well known from the literature (Allen and Michaely, 2003; Kalay and 
Lemmon, 2008), do not relate specifically to the stakeholder conflict we are studying. 
Moreover, their relationship with dividends might at least initially be considered independent 
of bank type. Thus, we leave potential interactions between organizational form and the other 
dividend determinants to the robustness tests. 
 Lintner (1956) was first to document that most firms have much more stable dividends 
than earnings. We account for such dividend persistence by the lagged payout ratio and predict 
a positive β2. The expected sign of β3 for financial leverage is indeterminate from a corporate 
governance viewpoint, because both dividends and debt might be used to reduce the free cash 
flow. This logic means dividends and debt might be both substitutes (negative β3) and 
complements (positive β3). Increased debt might also induce stronger conflicts between owners 
and creditors. Since lower dividends might reduce this debt problem by leaving more equity in 
the firm to pay off creditors, a negative β3 is implied. Finally, we expect a negative β3 from a 
regulatory perspective, as increased debt brings the firm closer to the minimum capital 
coverage constraint. The closer the firm is to the mandatory equity floor, the lower the 
dividends that can be paid.14 Given all the above,, we leave the sign of β3 unspecified. 
 We predict a negative β4 for stock liquidity, as an illiquid security makes it more costly 
for the investors to undo the firm’s dividend policy by trading in the stock. The expected sign 
of the growth coefficient β5 is indeterminate. The pecking order logic suggests that higher 
growth induces lower dividends, as retained earnings are the cheapest source of financing 
under conditions of asymmetric information. On the other hand, growing firms are more 
dependent on new equity than other firms are. Therefore, they have stronger incentives to 
establish a good reputation in the stock market in order to reduce the cost of new equity. This 
motivation might be particularly true when the owners as a group are weak, such as the 
                                                                                                                                                          
fixed claims when measuring leverage in a savings bank. Deposits are treated as regular debt both in commercial 
banks and savings banks. 
14 The minimum capital coverage as specified by regulation uses a weighting system for the asset classes. As we 
lack balance-sheet data to implement this approach, we use unweighted assets by setting the capital coverage ratio 
equal to the leverage ratio.  
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stockholders in savings banks are. As we argued under the substitute model, paying 
consistently high dividends is a way to build reputation for not wasting free cash flow. Paying 
high dividends is also a vehicle for exposing the firm to scrutiny in the market for new equity 
issues. In this context, growth might induce higher dividends rather than lower ones. Lacking a 
formal model of the equilibrium relationship between these two opposing forces, we leave β5 
unspecified. Finally, since small firms in particular might use dividends to reduce information 
asymmetry, we predict a negative β6.  
 The base-case model (1) is estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS), pooled data, 
year dummies, and standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The year dummies 
control for unobservable, time-varying effects for the banking industry, which we assume have 
the same impact on dividend policy in both firm types. We cannot account for unobservable, 
firm-specific dividend determinants by fixed-effects estimation, since we need a time-invariant 
dummy to control for firm type. Random-effects estimation would solve this problem, but 
cannot handle lagged dependent variables, which we use to capture dividend persistence 
(Hsiao, 2003). We eliminate the effect of extreme outliers by winsorizing the 5% and 95% tails 
of each variable except those of the dummy variables. Section 4.2. examines the robustness of 
the base-case estimates to these assumptions and considers what happens when we use the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) rather than the base-case approach to account for 
possible lack of independence in the error term of the regression. 
 We standardize every variable except the bank-type dummy by deducting the mean 
value of the variable from each observation and dividing the difference by the variable’s 
standard deviation. The coefficient estimate for the standardized variable has the same t-value 
as for the unstandardized variable, but expresses economic significance more directly. By 
having an expected value of zero and a standard deviation of one, its regression coefficient 
shows the number of standard deviations the payout ratio is expected to change if the dividend 
determinant changes by one standard deviation. Thus, the higher the absolute value of the 
standardized coefficient, the stronger the economic significance of the determinant.  
 Table 7 shows that the estimates of the base-case model explain 62% of the variation in 
dividend payout.15 The key result is that the coefficient for the savings bank dummy (β1) is 
positive and statistically significant. This finding is consistent with the substitute model and 
refutes the outcome model. The relationship is also considerably stronger economically than 
for any other determinant. 
                                                 
15 The correlation matrix does not suggest serious multicollinearity problems. The only variables which correlate 
considerably are size and leverage, where the correlation coefficient is 0.57.  
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Insert table 7 here 
 As expected, dividends are persistent (β2 > 0). Dividends do not respond systematically 
to changes in debt financing (β3), suggesting that closeness to capital coverage constraints is 
not an important concern when dividend decisions are made.16 Neither is stock liquidity (β4), 
which means firms with a less liquid stock do not pay higher dividends to offset their owners’ 
higher costs of transforming capital gains into cash. Higher growth makes the firm pay higher 
dividends (β5 > 0), which supports the reputation logic of the substitute model. Finally, small 
firms pay higher dividends than large firms do (β6 < 0). To the extent that larger size reflects 
greater information transparency, this result supports the idea that paying dividends reduces the 
future cost of new equity.17 
 
4.2. Robustness 
We first analyze whether the base-case results from model (1) are sensitive to using 
non-winsorized data and alternative econometric techniques. Second, we replace the classic 
dividend ratio used so far by three alternative measures proposed in the literature. Third, (1) is 
estimated without lagged dividends to check whether controlling for dividend persistence 
makes the bank-type dummy act as a proxy for dividend growth rather than for stakeholder 
control. Fourth, we analyze whether stakeholder control interacts with the relationship between 
dividends, size, and growth. Finally, we include more ownership characteristics in (1) than just 
organizational form.18 
 Model I in table 8 repeats the base-case results from table 7. According to model II, 
including observations outside the 5% and 95% bounds does not change our major result that 
firms pay higher dividends when non-owner stakeholders are in control. No other determinant 
is statistically significant, however, and the model explains just 9% of variations in the payout 
ratio, compared to 62% for the model that uses winsorized data. Thus, as expected, including 
the outliers in the data set reduces the precision of the estimates.  
Insert table 8 here 
                                                 
16 As a robustness check, we alternatively classify subordinated debt as equity in the leverage ratio. We also test a 
version of (1) with a 0/1 dummy variable which is 1 if and only if leverage is close to the legal minimum, using 
alternative definitions of closeness. The results, which are available upon request, show that the estimated 
relationships in (1) are robust to such alternative specifications of leverage. 
17 The estimates of the time-dummy coefficients (not reported in table 7) show that the industry-wide dividends to 
earnings ratio is significantly lower in 1991–1993, which is towards the end of the banking crisis. We return to 
such fixed industry effects in section 5.2..  
18 We have also augmented the base-case model by ROA to check whether the relationship between the payout 
ratio and stakeholder conflicts depends on the firm’s overall return on capital invested. The estimates, which are 
available upon request, show that the base-case relationship between dividends and bank type remains unchanged. 
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 Models III and IV account for unobservable firm effects by random-effects estimation. 
Since that approach cannot handle lagged dependent variables, the lagged payout ratio from (1) 
is dropped. As is evident by comparing model IV with model II, replacing OLS by random-
effects estimation has no material effect in the non-winsorized data set beyond increasing the 
coefficient of determination from 9% to 20%. Model III shows that the combination of 
winsorized data and random-effects estimation reproduces the base-case results from model I, 
except that liquidity becomes significant at the 10% level and size becomes even more 
significant both statistically and economically. 
 The random-effects approach is problematic in our setting because it must ignore the 
lagged dependent variable, which is a highly significant determinant in our tests so far and in 
the existing literature. On the other hand, ignoring unobservable firm effects in order to include 
the lagged dividend as a determinant might create new problems if the lagged dividend 
correlates with the unobservable firm effect in the error term. Therefore, we have estimated (1) 
using the less restrictive GMM-in-systems technique (Andres et al., 2009) as developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bond (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). As 
applied to our setting, this approach estimates a system of two types of equations where the 
variables are specified in levels and first differences. Lagged first differences of the variables 
are used as instruments for equations in levels, while lagged levels are used as instruments for 
equations in first differences. Hence, earlier realizations of the variables and of the differenced 
variables enter the estimation as instruments. 
 The findings are reported in models V and VI of table 8. The savings bank dummy in 
model V is positive and statistically significant, as in all columns to the left. When we also 
account for time effects by model VI, however, the statistical significance of bank type 
disappears. This loss of significance is due to the challenge of applying the GMM-in-systems 
approach to our setting. The problem is caused by a combination of the following factors: there 
are few observations in the cross section, there are many instruments to be estimated, and there 
is considerable loss of observations because of the lagging. Specifically, there are on average 
21 observations per year in the cross section, we use 111 instruments, and 48 observations are 
lost by the lagging. Moreover, the data set includes a highly autocorrelated variable (the payout  
ratio) and a relatively high ratio of time periods (14) to cross-sectional observations (21). The 
time-persistent payout ratio produces lower variation in the panel than in the cross section. As 
noted by Roodman (2009), this setting easily generates the overfitted endogenous variables as 
reflected in the high Sargan test statistic for models V and VI in the table. The resulting loss of 
power is less evident in model V, where (1) is estimated without time dummies.  
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 Table 8 shows that the base-case findings from table 7 are independent of whether we 
winsorize or whether we use random effects or GMM without time effects to account for a 
possible correlation between independent variables and the error term. Given the problems of 
using random effects and GMM in our setting, the estimates in the following are based on 
pooled, winsorized data, fixed-time effects, and cluster-adjusted standard errors. 
 The second robustness test analyzes the effect of using alternative payout measures. 
Table 9 summarizes the results. The first model is the base case from table 7, the second adds 
stock repurchases to the regular cash dividend, whereas models three and four normalize these 
two alternative numerators by cash flow from operations rather than by earnings. The table 
documents that the main result is insensitive to whether we include stock repurchases in the 
payout or normalize payout by cash flow. The control variables tend to be more significant 
when we normalize by cash flow, and these two models explain more of the variation in 
dividend policy. 
Insert table 9 here 
 We have found that dividends are persistent, and that savings banks tend to pay higher 
dividends than commercial banks do. This pattern might imply, however, that the savings bank 
dummy in (1) does not reflect differences in dividend levels across the two bank types. Rather, 
it might reflect differences in dividend growth, since the rather constant dividend-level effect 
might already be picked up by the lagged, persistent dividend term. In unreported regressions, 
which are available upon request, we delete lagged dividends from the base-case model. We 
still find that the role of the bank dummy remains unchanged. As expected, the other 
determinants become more significant than they are in the base case. Referring to the 
discussion of the pooled approach, the random-effects approach, and the GMM approach in 
table 8, the observed robustness to lagged dividends in table 9 is a further indication that the 
lack of independence between lagged dividends and the error term is not what drives our 
results in the base case. 
 The analysis so far suggests that, in addition to organizational form and the previous 
year’s dividend, the firm’s growth and size matter for the payout decision. In particular, 
dividends are higher in firms with high growth and low size, which supports the substitute 
model. Our fourth robustness test explores whether this relationship differs across the two bank 
types. We analyze this question in table 10 by interacting firm type with growth and size, 
respectively. According to the table, higher growth induces higher dividends, and this effect 
does not differ between the two bank types. For firm size, however, the tendency for smaller 
firms to pay higher dividends is pronounced only in the savings banks. Thus, firms controlled 
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by non-owners seem to reduce size-related information asymmetry costs by means of their 
dividend policy.  
Insert table 10 here 
 Corporate governance research argues theoretically and shows empirically that 
performance might improve when some owners have sufficiently strong incentives and power 
to monitor management (Becht et al., 2003). This relationship suggests that certain properties 
of the ownership structure matter for key decisions in the firm, such as the dividend policy. 
The final robustness test considers how dividends relate to the firm’s ownership structure and 
to the separation between cash-flow rights and voting rights. We also control for dividend-
clientele effects by adding a dummy variable, which is one if the largest stockholder is a person 
and zero otherwise.  
 According to the outcome model, higher ownership concentration induces higher 
dividend payout. The substitute model predicts the payout will be lower. We use the stake of 
the firm’s largest stockholder to measure ownership concentration. However, since ownership 
concentration is consistently low across the sample because of a regulatory constraint, it would 
be disturbing if this variable were significant in the regression. Indeed, such a result would 
question our rationale for ignoring conflicts between stockholders in the first place, and hence 
would question our argument for having made a particularly clean test. 
 As in table 3, we measure separation by the ratio sep ≡ (c - v) / c, where c is the 
owners’ aggregate fraction of cash-flow rights in the firm and v is their aggregate fraction of 
voting rights. A higher sep means more separation and hence weaker stockholder control. 
Hence, the predicted relationship between sep and dividends is negative under the outcome 
model and positive under the substitute model. These two alternative relationships are the 
agency effect of separation on dividend payout.  
Because of peculiarities in our sample, however, sep also reflects a financial-drain 
effect of dividends, which cannot be ignored. Because v is a constant 25% in all savings banks, 
differences in sep across savings banks are exclusively due to differences in the stockholders’ 
fraction of residual cash-flow rights, c. In particular, sep increases monotonically with c in the 
savings bank sample. This relationship implies that the stronger the separation, as measured by 
a high sep, the higher the dividend that is required to achieve a given payout ratio. To illustrate, 
suppose total earnings are 100 units and that the firm chooses a payout ratio of 80%. This 
means that the required dividend is 8 units if stockholders own 10% of the equity. If they own 
70%, however, the required dividend for the 80% payout is 56 units rather than just 8. Thus, 
for a fixed payout ratio, the drain on retained earnings increases proportionally as sep grows. 
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Because of the cost of raising new equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984), the drainage effect on 
retained earnings dictates a negative relationship between sep and dividends.  
Overall, these results mean that under the outcome model, both the agency effect and 
the financing effect imply a negative relationship between sep and dividends. Under the 
substitute model, the relationship is positive if the agency effect dominates, and is negative if 
the financing effect dominates. 
 Table 11 reports the results across the four alternative payout measures. Four features 
emerge. First, the role of the savings bank dummy is unchanged. Second, and reassuringly, 
ownership concentration is not a significant determinant of payout. Third, the relationship 
between separation and dividends is negative and significant. Considering the consistent 
findings in favor of the substitute model so far, we interpret such consistency as evidence that 
the negative financial-drain effect of separation dominates the positive agency effect. Finally, 
the significant, positive relationship between dividends and personal ownership under two of 
the payout measures supports the clientele argument that the composition of stockholder types 
in the firm influences its dividend decision. Moreover, the positive sign is consistent with the 
substitute model. 
Insert table 11 here 
 Summarizing, we have shown that after having accounted for differences in past 
dividends, financial leverage, stock liquidity, firm growth, firm size, and unobservable industry 
effects, dividends are significantly higher both statistically and economically in non-owner-
controlled firms than in owner-controlled firms. The robustness tests document that this result 
survives under alternative data sets, dividend payout measures, and when we account for 
ownership structure differences, interaction effects, the separation between ownership and 
control, and for unobservable firm and industry characteristics. Moreover, a higher share of 
stockholders’ earnings is paid out when the firm is small and when it grows fast. Overall, this 
evidence, which is based on the population rather than a sample, is consistent with the 
substitute model and inconsistent with the outcome model.  
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5. Summary and conclusions 
Conflicts of interest between the stakeholders might reduce the firm’s ability to create 
value. This paper uses a novel approach in order to analyze whether dividend policy plays a 
role in this context by influencing the actual as opposed to the potential conflict of interest 
between the firm’s stakeholders. In particular, we study whether the fraction of earnings paid 
out as dividends depends on the potential seriousness of the agency problem as reflected in the 
distribution of control rights among the firm’s owners and non-owners. We find that it does, 
because larger potential agency conflict between these two stakeholder groups tends to make 
the strong stakeholder choose a dividend policy that reduces the actual agency conflict. 
 We use an empirical approach that focuses on firms where the agency conflict between 
large and small owners can be ignored because regulation mandates relatively low ownership 
concentration in all firms. In contrast, potential conflicts between owners and non-owners vary 
more than usual across the sample. This cross-sectional variation does not happen because 
ownership concentration varies from firm to firm, but rather because firm control belongs to 
the owners in one organizational form and to non-owners in the other. Because of the potential 
conflict of interest, these two parties might have opposing views on the firm’s optimal dividend 
policy. This sample property is our key to a clean test of how the seriousness of stakeholder 
conflicts can be influenced by the dividend policy.  
 Our major finding is that firms controlled by non-owner stakeholders pay out 
significantly higher dividends than do comparable firms controlled by owners. This evidence, 
which is robust to alternative model specifications and econometric techniques, is consistent 
with the substitute model and inconsistent with the outcome model. The finding suggests that 
dividends are used to mitigate inherent agency conflicts in the firm’s stakeholder structure. 
That is, when the potential agency conflict in the firm increases, the actual conflict is made 
smaller by a higher dividend payout. This inference is supported by indirect evidence that 
strong non-owner stakeholders use the current dividend policy to build valuable reputation 
with weak owners in the future. 
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Table 1
Stockholders' 
Firm type Stockholders Employees Depositors Community cash-flow rights, %
Commercial banks 73 27 0 0 100
Savings banks 25 25 25 25  5–74
Firm types, control rights, and cash-flow rights 
Notes: This table shows the distribution of the stakeholders' control rights and the stockholders' residual cash-
flow rights in the two firm types (commercial banks and savings banks) in our sample. The cash-flow rights in
a savings bank that do not belong to the stockholders are ownerless.
Stakeholders' control rights, %
Sample size, aggregate size per firm type, and size per firm
Year All Mean Median Mean Median
1989 16 13 3 403.29 12.42 31.02 7.76 4.14 2.13
1990 13 10 3 430.83 12.54 43.08 9.35 4.18 2.18
1991 12 8 4 258.55 83.08 32.32 9.26 20.77 5.39
1992 14 10 4 265.61 83.73 26.56 7.33 20.93 5.18
1993 14 10 4 352.46 88.34 35.25 8.62 22.08 5.90
1994 17 9 8 350.29 148.27 38.92 11.29 18.53 12.54
1995 21 9 12 386.27 184.13 42.92 22.01 15.34 7.86
1996 21 8 13 444.44 212.46 55.55 19.13 16.34 5.88
1997 23 9 14 516.93 244.87 57.44 16.95 17.49 5.42
1998 28 9 19 546.59 285.69 60.73 18.32 15.04 3.74
1999 26 6 20 577.18 356.22 96.20 24.53 17.81 4.30
2000 28 6 22 638.83 413.74 106.47 26.80 18.81 4.86
2001 27 5 22 425.68 460.03 85.14 28.23 20.91 5.19
2002 27 6 21 709.10 263.52 118.18 32.47 12.55 5.52
Sum 287 118 169 6,306.06 2,849.05 829.78 242.03 224.93 76.09
Mean 21 8 12 450.43 203.50 59.27 17.29 16.07 5.44
Median 21 9 13 428.25 198.29 49.32 12.77 17.65 5.03
St. dev. 6 2 8 133.04 142.50 31.72 8.54 86.29 2.53
Notes: This table shows the total number of firms in the sample (All), the number of firms per type
(commercial banks and savings banks), the aggregate size per firm type, and the mean and median size per
individual firm of each type. We measure size as total assets in billion NOK as of year 2002. The sample is
all commercial banks and savings banks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange by year end.
Commercial 
banks
Savings 
banks
Commercial 
banks
Savings 
banks
banks banks
Commercial Savings
Table 2
Number of firms Aggregate size  Size per firm
Characteristic Mean Std Median Mean Std Median Mean (t) Median (z) 
Risk
Asset risk, % 14.39 5.83 13.45 8.40 2.88 7.81 6.00 (12.12) 5.63 (11.81)
Liability risk, % 54.75 24.07 48.96 33.77 12.48 33.74 20.98 (10.99) 15.22 (9.17)
Leverage, % 94.29 2.92 94.40 91.79 3.15 92.85 2.50 (6.92) 1.55 (6.78)
Earnings risk, % 1.69 1.91 1.34 0.48 0.40 0.42 1.21 (2.64) 0.92 (1.96)
Systematic risk 0.78 0.39 0.74 0.89 0.46 0.89 -0.11 (-0.92) -0.15 (-0.83)
Return
ROA, % 0.42 0.85 0.78 0.45 0.76 0.75 0.02 (-0.09) -0.30 (0.37)
Stock return, % 20.44 73.76 9.04 14.83 38.47 9.67 5.61 (0.72) -0.63 (-0.04)
Capital gain, % 15.74 73.57 5.51 6.66 39.27 -0.40 9.07 (1.19) 5.92 (0.87)
Dividend yield, % 4.70 4.69 5.03 8.18 2.63 8.46 -3.48 (-7.52) -3.43 (-8.43)
Liquidity 
Turnover, % 60.18 66.32 40.01 27.01 25.13 17.28 33.17 (6.16) 22.73 (5.10)
Growth
Asset growth, % 9.92 21.73 7.91 13.71 9.45 12.39 -3.79 (-1.94) -4.48 (-3.52)
Tobin's Q 1.01 0.43 1.00 1.21 0.29 1.17 -0.20 (-4.77) -0.18 (-5.94)
Commercial banks Savings banks Difference
Notes: The table shows the mean value, the standard deviation (std), and the median value for proxies of
risk, return, liquidity, and growth. We measure Asset risk as the percentage of assets that is not cash,
claims on the central bank, amortizable loans, or fixed assets. Liability risk is the percentage of liabilities
that is not deposits. Leverage is total debt as a percentage of total assets, while Earnings risk is the standard 
deviation of ROA (net income over total assets). Systematic risk is the stock's beta estimated over the
sample period from monthly stock returns. Stock return is capital gains plus dividend yield, and Turnover
is the value of the trade in the stock during the year in percent of its market value at year end. Asset growth
is the relative increase in total assets over the year, and Tobin's Q is measured as the market value of stock
divided by its book value. The means and medians are equally weighted across firms and years. The
sample is all commercial banks and savings banks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange by year end at least
once over the period 1989–2002.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for risk, return, liquidity, and growth 
Ownership structure 
Characteristic Mean Median Mean Median Mean (t) Median (z)
Largest owner, % 15.99 10.00 6.98 6.00 9.01 (7.46) 4.00 (8.94)
Five largest owners, % 37.61 32.00 18.06 17.00 19.55 (12.84) 15.00 (10.53)
Personal owners, % 21.66 20.00 50.56 52.00 -28.89 (-11.62) -32.00 (-9.34)
Separation 0.27 0.27 0.18 0.38 0.09 (1.75) -0.11 (-2.57)
Table 4
Notes: The table shows ownership characteristics across the two firm types (commercial banks and savings
banks). We report the percentage equity holding of the firm's largest owner, the aggregate percentage holding
of the five largest owners, and the aggregate percentage holding in the firm by personal owners (individuals).
Separation reflects the wedge between the stockholders' cash-flow rights and control rights. We operationalize
Separation as the difference between the stockholders' contractual fraction of cash-flow rights and their
contractual fraction of board seats, divided by the stockholders' fraction of cash-flow rights. The sample is all
commercial banks and savings banks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange by year end at least once during the
period 1989–2002. Data source: Verdipapirsentralen ASA.
Commercial banks Savings banks Difference
Dividend characteristics
Year All
1989 56.25
1990 38.46
1991 16.67
1992 14.29
1993 57.14
1994 88.24
1995 95.24
1996 95.24
1997 95.65
1998 100.00
1999 100.00
2000 100.00
2001 96.30
2002 88.89
Mean 74.45
Median 92.06
St. dev. 31.66
All
Year Mean Mean Median Mean Median Mean (t) Median (z)
1989 83.53 60.04 51.47 130.50 125.70 -70.46 (-4.89) -74.23 (-2.32)
1990 121.39 89.68 89.68 142.53 138.45 -52.85 (-2.66) -48.77 (-1.73)
1991 147.25 n.a. n.a. 147.25 147.25 n.a. (n.a.) n.a. (n.a.)
1992 27.97 6.82 0.07 49.12 49.12 -42.31 (n.a.) -49.05 (-1.00)
1993 53.41 25.66 0.27 81.17 69.83 -55.51 (-2.80) -69.56 (-2.31)
1994 62.33 50.32 42.99 76.05 80.74 -25.73 (-1.60) -37.74 (-2.08)
1995 62.68 53.94 45.81 69.04 57.99 -15.11 (-1.13) -12.17 (-1.25)
1996 75.11 44.71 41.49 91.49 99.15 -46.78 (-4.95) -57.67 (-3.13)
1997 75.92 45.63 44.35 93.23 103.13 -47.60 (-4.91) -58.77 (-3.41)
1998 106.14 47.78 47.76 133.78 96.36 -86.00 (-1.46) -48.60 (-3.57)
1999 79.69 46.87 51.14 89.41 96.66 -42.54 (-4.38) -45.52 (-2.85)
2000 78.56 36.37 35.16 89.32 98.90 -52.95 (-5.74) -63.74 (-3.06)
2001 89.49 38.46 40.58 101.32 102.97 -62.87 (-6.11) -62.39 (-3.11)
2002 129.90 45.94 50.00 145.02 104.76 -99.09 (-0.66) -54.76 (-2.47)
All 84.71 47.38 44.72 103.73 102.18 -56.35 (-4.40) -57.46 (-9.98)
St. dev. 98.72 25.65 114.73
All
Year Mean Mean Median Mean Median Mean (t) Median (z)
1989 40.84 39.96 48.53 42.60 49.65 -2.64 (-0.18) -1.12 (-0.05)
1990 25.36 10.32 10.32 35.38 44.20 -25.07 (-1.37) -33.88 (-0.58)
1991 20.25 n.a. n.a. 20.25 20.25 n.a. (n.a.) n.a. (n.a.)
1992 86.62 93.18 93.18 80.06 80.06 13.12 (n.a.) 13.12 (1.00)
1993 65.92 74.34 73.30 57.51 71.30 16.83 (1.04) 1.99 (0.58)
1994 55.78 49.68 57.01 62.75 64.27 -13.07 (-0.90) -7.26 (-0.81)
1995 58.05 46.06 54.19 67.85 66.77 -21.79 (-2.12) -12.59 (-1.79)
1996 60.51 55.29 58.51 63.31 58.98 -8.02 (-1.14) -0.46 (-0.59)
1997 59.04 54.37 55.65 61.71 58.27 -7.34 (-0.98) -2.62 (-0.55)
1998 48.68 52.22 52.24 47.00 59.73 5.21 0.20 -7.49 (-1.4)
1999 64.77 53.13 48.86 67.68 68.04 -14.54 (-2.12) -19.19 (-1.56)
2000 69.28 63.63 64.84 70.30 68.70 -6.67 (-1.02) -3.86 (-0.92)
2001 67.12 61.54 59.42 68.18 65.40 -6.63 (-0.92) -5.98 (-0.96)
2002 35.69 54.06 50.00 32.79 66.27 21.27 (0.27) -16.27 (-0.82)
All 56.62 52.41 54.64 58.52 65.38 -6.11 (-0.89) -3.18 (-3.18)
91.67
87.5088.89
100.00
87.50 100.00
A. Payout propensity
40.00
Commercial banks
0.00
Savings banks
46.15
20.00
10.00
100.00
100.00
25.00
50.00
100.00
Table 5 
100.00
88.89
100.00
100.00
88.19
100.00
100.00
88.92
95.24
95.45
100.00
100.00
66.67
67.72
100.00
100.00
37.13
Notes: This table shows the percentage of firms in the sample that pay cash dividends (panel A), the payout ratio
for dividend payers (panel B), and the retention ratio for dividend payers (panel C). The payout ratio is cash
dividends divided by the earnings that belong to the stockholders. The retention ratio is the fraction of total
earnings not paid out as dividends to the stockholders. All ratios are percentages. The sample is all commercial
banks and savings banks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange by year end.
C. Retention ratio for dividend payers
B. Payout ratio for dividend payers
Commercial banks Savings banks
Savings banksCommercial banks
Difference
Difference
22.66
Commercial Savings
Year banks banks
1989 46.15 66.67
1990 50.00 33.33
1991 37.50 50.00
1992 30.00 25.00
1993 40.00 50.00
1994 22.22 37.50
1995 11.11 8.33
1996 12.50 15.38
1997 11.11 21.43
1998 55.56 10.53
1999 33.33 10.00
2000 33.33 13.64
2001 40.00 13.64
2002 33.33 14.29
Mean 31.30 17.75
Median 33.33 18.41
St. dev. 14.12 18.34
Year Mean Median Mean Median Mean (t) Median (z)
1989 55.87 26.41 33.61 33.61 22.26 (0.37) -7.20 (-0.33)
1990 5.75 3.18 2.07 2.07 3.68 (n.a.) 1.11 (0.88)
1991 38.82 40.93 17.72 17.72 21.10 (0.82) 23.22 (1.16)
1992 332.34 64.02 17.49 17.49 314.85 (n.a.) 46.52 (0.45)
1993 35.91 31.47 19.41 19.41 16.49 (0.94) 12.05 (0.93)
1994 12.84 12.84 36.49 24.78 -23.65 (-1.16) -11.95 (-1.73)
1995 10.43 10.43 42.28 42.28 -31.85 (n.a.) -31.85 (-1.00)
1996 0.68 0.68 7.35 7.35 -6.67 (n.a.) -6.67 (n.a.)
1997 0.54 0.54 21.45 20.40 -20.91 (n.a.) -19.86 (-1.34)
1998 18.14 13.84 19.57 19.57 -1.42 (-0.12) -5.73 (-0.39)
1999 10.18 10.18 6.27 6.27 3.90 (n.a.) 3.90 (n.a.)
2000 16.97 16.97 0.59 0.52 16.38 (1.33) 16.45 (n.a.)
2001 4.58 4.58 5.72 0.31 -1.14 (-0.15) 4.27 (0.58)
2002 9.15 9.15 5.36 0.44 3.79 (0.42) 8.71 (1.16)
Mean 45.81 13.67 15.95 15.95 29.86 (1.15) -2.28 (-0.68)
Difference
Notes: This table describes the firms' equity issuing behavior. Panel A shows the
percentage of banks issuing new equity, and panel B shows new share capital as a
percentage of existing share capital (owned plus ownerless share capital in savings banks)
for issuing firms. The sample is all commercial banks and savings banks listed on the
Oslo Stock Exchange by year end.
Commercial banks Savings banks
B. Issue volume
A. Issue propensity
Table 6
Equity issue activity
Estimates of the base-case model
Characteristic Hypothesis Coefficient
Savings bank dummy O: - ; S: + 0.793***
(3.34)
Lagged payout + 0.302*
(1.72)
Leverage ? -0.040
(-0.69)
Liquidity - 0.090
(1.47)
Growth ? 0.124**
(2.08)
Size - -0.142*
(-1.73)
Constant -1.623***
(-2.82)
Sample size 211
R2 adjusted 0.62
F-ratio 19.06***
Notes: This table relates a bank's dividend payment to potential determinants. The
dependent variable is cash dividends divided by stockholders' earnings. Savings
bank dummy equals one if the bank is a savings bank and zero otherwise. Lagged
payout is the dependent variable one period earlier. Leverage is total debt over total
assets, and Liquidity is the market value of the trade in the stock over the year
divided by its market value at year end. We measure Growth as the relative increase
in assets over the year, while Size is the log of total assets in NOK1000. In the
Hypothesis column, O refers to the Outcome model, S to the Substitution model, and
the signs reflect the predicted relationship between dividends and the independent
variable in question. The model is estimated on the pooled sample with year
dummies (not reported), and we use standard errors adjusted for clustering at the
firm level. Non-dummy data are winsorized at the 5% and 95% tails. We standardize
every non-dummy variable by deducting the mean value of the variable from each
observation and dividing the difference by the variable's standard deviation. The t-
values are shown in parentheses, and statistically significant relationships at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels are labeled as *, **, and ***, respectively. The sample is all 
commercial banks and savings banks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange by year end
at least once during the period 1989–2002.
Table 7
Outliers, random-effects estimation, and GMM estimation
Characteristic I II III IV V VI
Savings bank dummy 0.793*** 0.694*** 1.163*** 0.669*** 0.677*** 0.325
(3.34) (3.79) (9.00) (4.31) (2.82) (0.39)
Lagged payout 0.302* 0.053 0.031 -0.059
(1.72) (0.68) (0.11) (-0.08)
Leverage -0.04 -0.019 0.039 -0.01 3.326 -1.587
(-0.69) (-0.62) (0.57) (-0.12) (1.43) (-0.29)
Liquidity 0.09 0.071 0.098* 0.076 0.03 0.017
(1.47) (1.48) (1.85) (1.02) (0.05) (0.03)
Growth 0.124** -0.26 0.145** -0.102 0.18 0.166
(2.08) (-0.70) (2.43) (-0.37) (0.23) (0.32)
Size -0.142* -0.045 -0.236*** -0.057 0.042 -0.106
(-1.73) (-0.42) (-3.40) (-0.71) (0.29) (-0.22)
Constant -1.623*** -0.829** -0.951*** -0.415 -3.634** 2.890
(-2.82) (-2.62) (-3.20) (-0.85) (-1.96) (0.32)
Sample size 211 211 259 259 211 211
Winsorized Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
R2 adjusted 0.62 0.09 0.65 0.20
Autocorr 1st order (z) -1.086 -0.566
Autocorr 2nd order (z) 0.920 0.555
Sargan (Chi2) 24.97 17.61
F-ratio (Chi2) 19.06*** 2.13*** 297.18*** 59.32*** 23.63*** 330.14***
Pooled Random effects GMM
Table 8
Notes: This table compares the use of non-winsorized data, random-effects estimation, and GMM-in-systems estimation to the base-
case approach from table 7 (model I). Models II–VI are explained in the main text. The dependent variable is cash dividends over
stockholders' earnings. Savings bank dummy equals one if the bank is a savings bank and zero otherwise. Lagged payout is the
dependent variable one period earlier. Leverage is total debt over total assets, and Liquidity is the market value of the trade in the
stock over the year divided by its market value at year end. We measure Growth as the relative increase in assets over the year, while
Size is the log of total assets in NOK1000. For GMM we report the z-values for the Arellano-Bond test for first- and second-order
autocorrelation and the Sargan test of overindentifying restrictions. Non-dummy data are winsorized at the 5% and 95% tails where
indicated. The t-values are shown in parentheses, and statistically significant relationships at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are labeled
as *, **, and ***, respectively. The sample is all commercial banks and savings banks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange by year end
at least once during the period 1989–2002.
Alternative measures of dividend payout
Characteristic Div / E (Div + Rep) / E Div / CF (Div + Rep) / CF
Savings bank dummy 0.793*** 0.784*** 0.501*** 0.507***
(3.34) (3.34) (3.90) (4.00)
Lagged payout 0.302* 0.310* 0.458*** 0.458***
(1.72) (1.75) (4.82) (4.83)
Leverage -0.04 -0.066 -0.156*** -0.165***
(-0.69) (-1.10) (-3.47) (-3.69)
Liquidity 0.09 0.09 0.109* 0.110*
(1.47) (1.49) (1.83) (1.85)
Growth 0.124** 0.125** 0.173** 0.171**
(2.08) (2.13) (2.68) (2.63)
Size -0.142* -0.123 -0.095* -0.088
(-1.73) (-1.49) (-1.77) (-1.64)
Constant 0.796 1.08 3.185*** 3.327***
(0.99) (1.29) (3.48) (3.63)
Sample size 211 211 211 211
R2 adjusted 0.62 0.63 0.72 0.72
F-ratio 19.06*** 19.55*** 29.75*** 29.87***
Table 9
Payout measure
Notes: This table reports the effect of estimating the base-case model with alternative dividend-payout measures,
which are (i) cash dividends (Div) over earnings (E), (ii) cash dividends and repurchases (Rep) over earnings, (iii)
cash dividends over cash flow from operations (CF), and (iv) cash dividends and repurchases over cash flow from
operations. The denominator in the payout ratio reflects only the earnings or cash flow that belongs to the
stockholders. Savings bank dummy equals one if the bank is a savings bank and zero otherwise. Lagged payout is the
dependent variable one period earlier, Leverage is total debt over total assets, and Liquidity is the market value of
the trade over the year divided by the market value of the stock at year end. We measure Growth as the relative
increase in assets over the year, while Size is the log of total assets in NOK1000. We standardize every non-dummy
variable by deducting its mean value from each observation and dividing the difference by the variable's standard
deviation. Non-dummy data are winsorized at 5% and 95%. The models are estimated on the pooled sample with
year dummies (not reported), and we use standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The t-values are
shown in parentheses, and statistically significant relationships at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are labeled as *, **,
and ***, respectively. The sample is all commercial banks and savings banks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange by
year end at least once during the period 1989–2002.
Interacting stakeholder control with the firm's growth and size
Characteristic Coefficient
Savings bank dummy 0.989***
(4.38)
Lagged payout 0.199
(1.12)
Leverage -0.011
(-0.17)
Liquidity 0.098*
(1.85)
Growth 0.158*
(1.72)
Size 0.014
(0.22)
Growth * Savings bank dummy -0.142
(-1.46)
Size * Savings bank dummy -0.342**
(-2.72)
Constant -1.842***
(-2.82)
Sample size 211
R2 adjusted 0.65
F-ratio 19.96
Table 10
Notes: This table expands the base-case model from table 7 by interacting
stakeholder control with the firm's growth and size. The dependent variable is
cash dividends divided by stockholders' earnings. Savings bank dummy equals
one if the bank is a savings bank and zero otherwise. Lagged payout is the
dependent variable one period earlier. Leverage is total debt over total assets,
and Liquidity is the market value of the trade in the stock during the year
divided by its market value at year end. We measure Growth as the relative
increase in assets during the year, while Size is the log of total assets in
NOK1000. We include two interaction terms where we multiply the savings
bank dummy by the growth variable and by the size variable, respectively. We
standardize every non-dummy variable by deducting the mean value of the
variable from each observation and dividing the difference by the variable's
standard deviation. Non-dummy data are winsorized at 5% and 95%. The
models are estimated on the pooled sample with year dummies (not reported),
and we use standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The t-values
are shown in parentheses, and statistically significant relationships at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels are labeled as *, **, and ***, respectively. The sample is all
commercial banks and savings banks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange by year
end at least once during the period 1989–2002.
Characteristic Hypothesis Div / E (Div + Rep) / E Div / CF (Div + Rep) / CF
Savings bank dummy O: - ; S: + 0.902*** 0.893*** 0.818*** 0.819***
(3.34) (3.33) (3.84) (3.88)
Largest holding O: - ; S: + 0.017 0.022 -0.09 -0.087
(0.21) (0.28) (-1.30) (-1.25)
Separation O: - ; S: ? -0.345*** -0.376*** -0.346*** -0.354***
(-2.78) (-3.05) (-3.20) (-3.30)
Largest is person O: - ; S: + 0.097** 0.098** 0.023 0.023
(2.26) (2.25) (0.64) (0.64)
Lagged payout + 0.224 0.224 0.382*** 0.380***
(1.20) (1.21) (3.51) (3.48)
Leverage ? -0.013 -0.039 -0.088 -0.099
(-0.18) (-0.55) (-1.40) (-1.63)
Liquidity - 0.087 0.087 0.097 0.098
(1.37) (1.37) (1.42) (1.43)
Growth ? 0.033 0.032 0.075 0.073
(0.54) (0.52) (1.42) (1.36)
Size - -0.115 -0.094 -0.087 -0.079
(-1.34) (-1.12) (-1.62) (-1.50)
Constant -0.29 -1.785*** -0.656 -0.657
(-0.42) (3.23) (-0.97) (-0.98)
Sample size 202 202 202 202
R2 adjusted 0.63 0.64 0.72 0.72
F-ratio 133.87*** 133.51*** 228.08*** 275.05***
Table 11
Notes : This table expands the models from table 9 by variables that account for ownership concentration, direct
(personal) ownership, and for the separation between ownership and control, respectively. The alternative
dependent variables are (i) dividends (Div) over earnings (E), (ii) dividends and repurchases (Rep) over earnings,
(iii) dividends over cash flow from operations (CF), and (iv) dividends and repurchases over cash flow from
operations. The denominators of these payout ratios reflect only the earnings or cash flow that belongs to the
stockholders. Savings bank dummy is a variable that equals one if the bank is a savings bank and zero otherwise.
Largest holding is the ownership fraction of the largest owner, and Separation is aggregate cash-flow rights in the
firm minus aggregate voting rights divided by aggregate cash-flow rights. Largest is person is a dummy variable
which is 1 if the largest owner is a person and zero otherwise. Leverage is total debt over total assets; Liquidity is
the market value of the trade in the stock during the year divided by its market value at year end. We measure
Growth as the relative increase in assets during the year, while Size is the log of total assets in NOK1000. In the
Hypothesis column, O refers to the Outcome model, S is the Substitution model, and the signs reflect the predicted
relationship between dividends and the independent variable in question. We standardize every non-dummy
variable by deducting the mean value of the variable from each observation and dividing the difference by the
variable's standard deviation. Non-dummy data are winsorized at 5% and 95%. The models are estimated on the
pooled sample with year dummies (not reported), and we use standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm
level. The t-values are shown in parentheses, and statistically significant relationships at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels are labeled as *, **, and ***, respectively. The sample is all commercial banks and savings banks listed on
the Oslo Stock Exchange by year end at least once during the period 1989–2002.
Payout measure
Accounting for ownership structure characteristics
